In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and (...) that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants. (shrink)

"Proceedings of an International Symposium on Measuring Economic Freedom, held July 28-30, 1988, in Vancouver, British Columbia"--T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references (p. [174]-175).

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 57-59.

This paper studies a family of monotonic extensions of first-order logic which we call modulated logics, constructed by extending classical logic through generalized quantifiers called modulated quantifiers. This approach offers a new regard to what we call flexible reasoning. A uniform treatment of modulated logics is given here, obtaining some general results in model theory. Besides reviewing the “Logic of Ultrafilters”, which formalizes inductive assertions of the kind “almost all”, two new monotonic logical systems are proposed here, the “Logic of (...) Many” and the “Logic of Plausibility”, that characterize assertions of the kind “many”, and “for a good number of”. Although the notion of simple majority (“more than half”) can be captured by means of a modulated quantifier semantically interpreted by cardinal measure on evidence sets, it is proven that this system, although sound, cannot be complete if checked against the intended model. This justifies the interest on a purely qualitative approach to this kind of quantification, what is guaranteed by interpreting the modulated quantifiers as notions of families of principal filters and reduced topologies, respectively. We prove that both systems are conservative extensions of classical logic that preserve important properties, such as soundness and completeness. Some additional perspectives connecting our approach to flexible reasoning through modulated logics to epistemology and social choice theory are also discussed. (shrink)

In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's affirmative answer as presented in his discourse theory of morality. Habermas's position is articulated as a moral epistemology and is developed through his critique of the “monologism” of certain aspects of Immanuel Kant's moral (...) theory. Okshevsky concludes with a consideration of some educational implications of Habermas's position. (shrink)

Only six men have written a major work on Old Testament ethics in the last hundred years, and only two of these works, both written before 1900, are in English.

In this article, Walter Parker brings structure and agency to the foreground of the current tumult of public schooling in the United States. He focuses on three structures that are serving as rules and resources for creative agency. These are a discourse of derision about failing schools, a broad mobilization of multiculturalism, and an enduring nationalism. Drawing on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory, Parker examines how these discourses figure in redefining school reform, redefining school curricula, and requiring schools once again to (...) serve nationalistic purposes. (shrink)

Not the least interesting feature in Mr. C. C. J. Webb's new edition of John of Salisbury's Policraticus are the references to the passages of Roman literature from which his author has quoted or borrowed. One cannot speak too highly of the thoroughness with which the editor has carried out this part of his task; that a few cases of borrowing should have passed unnoticed, and the sources of a few quotations evaded his inquiries, was inevitable.

Contr. I. The characters of this declamation are two brothers, at deadly enmity with each other, and the son of one of them, who, when his uncle is reduced to beggary, supports him in spite of his father′s prohibition. Disowned by the latter, he is adopted by his uncle, who presently grows rich—at the very moment when his brother loses everything. The young man again reveals his tender-heartedness, supports the unfortunate man in the face of his adopted father′s orders, and (...) is once more disowned. He pleads his case before a jury. (shrink)

Magni uir ingenii fuerat si illud egisset uia rectiore, si non uitasset intellegi, si non etiam in oratione difflueret. uidebis itaque eloquentiam ebrii hominis inuolutam et errantem et licentiae plenam. Maecenas De Cvltvsvo.* quid turpius ‘amne siluisque ripa comantibus?’ uide ut§ ‘alueum lyntribus arent uersoque uado Ĵ remittant hortos.’ quid? si quis ‘feminae cincinnos** crispat et labris columbatur incipitque suspirans, ut ceruice lassa fanantur nemoris tyranni.’ ‘inremediabilis factio rimantur epulis lagonaque temptant domos et spe mortem exigunt’ Sen. Epp. cxiv 4–5.

liii. 6. Seneca says that we try to conceal from ourselves the fact that we are ill, and can do this for a time. ‘Dubio et incipiente morbo quaeritur nomen, qui ubi ut talaria coepit intendere et utrosque dextros pedes fecit, necesse est podagram confiteri.’.